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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes a regulation game with no commitment. I expand Besanko
and Spulber's [2] framework to the case of elastic demands using a generalized
Nash solution. It is found that the most important property of the
equilibrium with inelastic demand is not carried over to the elastic demand
case, ie
.
, incomplete information worsens underinvestment, contrasting to
Besanko and Spulber's result.

/. INTRODUCTION
Besanko and Spulber [2] analyze a regulatory environment with the regulated firm possessing private
information about its cost. TJie structure of their model is as follows: the firm observes a realization of a cost
parameter (0) and then chooses a level of investment (k); the regulator does not observe 6 but observes k, which
allows him to infer B and set the price accordingly, given that he is unable to respect any previous agreement with
the firm.
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Tlie demand function and the level of investment are observed by both parties without incurring any
cost.
Limiting the study to the case of a perfectly inelastic demand function, they find that the regulator is able
to fully separate the different types of firms. Tlie regulator is seen as offering a price schedule to the firm
satisfying the condition that the information revealed by the firm when choosing an investment level does not
induce the regulator to change its initial offer. Tliey conclude that asymmetric information alleviates
underinvestment, and overinvestment may result only for the less efficient firms, as those are the ones that need
to invest more to signal their low state of technology.
In this paper I consider a similar problem but letting the demand function be elastic (with a constant
elasticity greater than one). Tlie equilibrium is also separating. Incomplete information, in contrast to the above
mentioned study, worsens underinvestment for the least efficient firms. Tliis result is due to the fact that for e
> 1 investment is a decreasing function of the technology parameter 9, for which the inefficient firms have to
invest less than in the complete information case so that the incentive compatibility constraint of the more efficient
firms is satisfied.
II. THE MODEL
Let the demand function be given by
x= D(p)= p-
,
(I)
where x represents quantity, p is the price and e is the demand elasticity. An exogenously given firm is scheduled
to provide the whole market. Following Besanko and Spulber, the regulated firm has a cost function
C(x,k,0)= xz 6/2k + rk, (2)
2 As it is the case in screening models with commitment, in which the timing is basically reversed. See
Baron and Myerson [If
where k is the level of investment, r is the rental cost of capital and 6 is the efficiency parameter of the firm
(BGfdpd-J). Tlie term x 2 9/2k corresponds to operating costs, which are decreasing on the level of investment.
Both the firm and the regulator know D(p), while r and k are public knowledge. Vie state of nature 6 is
observed only by the firm. Consumer surplus is given by S(p) = jy D(z)dz. Tlie regulator chooses a price p
and a transfer T in order to maximize the Generalized Nash welfare function:
W(p,T) = [S(p)-TJa[T + pD(p) - (D(p))2 6/2k - skj2
'a
. (3)
Tlie first bracket represents the consumer surplus net of transfers; the second is the firm's profit,
2
and
< a < 2 is a weighting parameter (ie., a = represents profit maximization).
Tlie timing of the model is as follows: the firm obsen'es a realization of 6; next the regulator offers a
schedule (p(k), T(k)} and finally the firm chooses k as a function of the realization 6 and the schedule offered
by the regulator.
At a separating equilibrium, the regulator is able to infer 8 from k. Knowing this and the fact that the
regulator is unable to commit to this schedule after discovering 8, the firm will choose k based on 8 and the price
and transfer that the regulator will set after calculating 8 from k.
III. INVESTMENT UNDER COMPLETE INFORMATION
Wlien regulatory commitment is feasible and 8 is commonly known, the regulator will set p and T in
such a way that price equals marginal cost and the level of capital is the level that minimizes the cost of
producing x. Viis solution can be implemented following Loeb and Magat [6], by giving all the (gross) consumer
surplus to the firm and redistributing part of it to the consumers through a lump-sum tax on the firm. In this
case p= xd/k and k = (x 2 8/2r) 1/2 . Using these two equations together with equation (1) results in
P = (28r)
l/1
(4)
k = (2r)- (e+l)/2 d- (
<- 1)/2
. (5)
In the absence of regulatory commitment, the firm maximizes its profits subject to the price and transfer
arising from the maximization of (3) with respect to p and T. Using the first order conditions in the maximization
of equation (3) and noting that S'(p)- -D(p), we can obtain that p = xd/k and T - S(p)((2a)/2) +
Observe that the regulator considers as rental cost of capital only the scrap value of capital, s, where s
< r, with s < r corresponding to the case where some investment costs are sunk.
[x 2 9/2k+sk-px], which, after using equation (I) and noting that S(p) - p~ {i
~ l)/(e-l) can be solved together
resulting in
p = (9/k) 1/a+i \ and (6)
f = [(4-a-ae)/(4e-4)J(9/k)a
' e)/(l+e)
+ ask/2. (7)
TJie firm's problem is then to max E - T + pD(p) - (D(p)) 2 6/2k - rk with respect to k, subject to equations
(1), (6) and (7). After introducing these equations into II and solving for k we obtain
k = [2(2r-as)/(2-a)f a+e)/z e (1
'
€)/2
. (8)
Comparing k in (8) and k in (5), we obtain k < k, with strict inequality for s < r (underinvestment
results from lack of commitment) . Also, from (8) we obtain the expected result dk/da < 0. (Note that k -
k if a = 0, and k = if a = 2).
IV. INVESTMENT UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION*
Let g(9) be the regidator's prior beliefs about 6. After obsen'ing k the regulator updates its prior beliefs
about 9. Let 5(k) be the expected value of 9 after observing k.
5
Definition:
A sequential equilibrium for the regulation game consists of the strategies k"(9), p" (k) and T"(k), and
beliefs 8"(k) such that:
(A) Vie firm chooses K*(9) to max n(k,p*,T*,6*) = f + p'D(p') - (D(p')) z9/2k - rk
(B) Vie regidator chooses p'(k) and T(k) to max W(k,p,T,S'
)
= (S(p)-T)(T + pD(p) - (D(p)) 2 S"(k)/2k - sk)
(C) Vie regulator's beliefs on the equilibrium path, k"~ l (k) * 0, are consistent with Bayes' rule and
the firm's equilibrium strategy k"(9).
Note that with incomplete information a separating equilibrium has to respect the incentive compatibility
constraint given by
To simplify the algebra I consider a = 1 in this section.
It becomes obvious later that the prior g(9), which plays a crucial role in screening models with
commitment as [1], is totally irrelevant for the (separating) equilibrium without commitment.
3
Tl(6,k*(0)) > Y[(9,k"(~6) for all 6 and G [6 0,6 J
6
[3)
In what follows I first show the difficulty one faces when trying to characterize the equilibrium, and then
I identify two particularities of the equilibrium: incomplete information worsens underinvestment and the incentive
compatibility constraint binds in only one direction. Tliese two properties are illustrated in a discrete treatment
of the equilibrium.
IV. 1. Trying to characterize the equilibrium.
Wlien the demand function is given by (I), the firm's problem can be written as
max 11(6,k) = T(k) + p(k) 1
' i
- p(k)~ 2e 6/2k - rk with respect to k. 77ie first order condition for a
maximum is
T(k)' + (I-e)p(k)' ep(k)' + edp(k)'p(k)~ U€+1)/k + p(k)' 2i 6/2k2 = r, from which we obtain
6 = [r-T(k)'-(I-e)p(k)- ip(k)']/[ep-' 2i+1)p(k)'/k+p(k)- Zi/2k2J. (10)
In equilibrium, 5(k) = 6, so we can replace (10) into (6) and (7) to obtain p(k) and T(k) under incomplete
information. Replacing (10) into (6) and after a few algebraic steps,
p(k)' = (r-T(k)')p(k) c -p(k)/2k.
Also, from (6) and (7), T(k) = [(3-t)/4(e-l)]p(k) e
~ l
+ sk/2. TJien, T(k)' = [(3-e)/4]p(k) €p(k)' +
s/2 can be replaced into p(k)' to obtain the differential equation in p(k) below
p(k)'= 2(2r-s)p(k) e (4 + (3-e)p(k) 2€ )- x-[2p(k)/kJ[4 + (3-e)p(k) 2ef\
whose solution would characterize the equilibrium up to a constant of integration
1
'. Obviously, the difficulty found
in characterizing the equilibrium consists of the difficulty of solving this differential equation. Nevertheless, certain
(important) properties of the equilibrium are identified below.
8
Tlic individual rationality constraint is always satisfied by construction of the welfare function as long as
the project is desirable, which is assumed to be the case.
which can be assigned a particular value using the universal divinity criterium (it basically requires that
positive probability be assigned only to those types that would benefit the most from deviation.) See Besanko and
Spulber (2 J, Cho and Kreps [3] and footnote 14.
Q
" It is assumed that a separating equilibrium does in fact exist. See footnote 9 below for a formalization
of this assumption.
IV.Z Firms underinvest relative to complete information.
Recall that dk/d9 < 0, so 8'(9) < is a sensible condition to impose on the beliefs of the regulator.
Note also that p *(8(k)) and T*(5(k)) are given by the adaptation to incomplete information of (6) and (7)
below,
p = (S(k)/k) inx+€ \ and (11)
f = [(4-a-ae)/(4e-4)](S(k)/k) a
' e)ni+€)
+ ask/2. (12)
Replacing (11) and (12) into the profit function of the firm,
E(9,p(S),T(6),5(k))=[(3-e)/(e-l)][S(k)/k]n
- i)ni+i)
+sk/2 + (6(k)/k) a
- e)/ ' 1+i)
-(S(k)/k)-2e/(1+i) 9/2k-rk.
Rearranging terms,
Tl(9,p(S),T(5),5(k)) = fS(k)/k] il
- ()/a+i) {(3e-l)/4(€-l)- 9/26(k)} + (s-2r)k/2.
Differentiating with respect to k and evaluating at S(k) = 9, ie., at the equilibrium,
dll/dk = (l/4)(9/k) {l
- e)/(1+e) [6'(k)/8 + W + (s-2r)/2 =
is the first order condition for a maximum. 9 If S'(k) = 0, as with complete infonnation, dU/dk = occurs at
k*(9) = k(9) = [2(2r-s)f a+€)/2 9 a
' e)/z
. Nevertheless, if S'(k) < 0, the sensible case with incomplete
infonnation, dU/dk < at k(9), which means that k"'(9) < k(9). 10
IV.3. The incentive compatibility constraint only binds in one direction.
To see this consider the following question: Given a level of investment k& = ^(9^, would a firm 9 X
want to be taken as a 9 j firm, with i > j, ie., with 9 L > 9 j?
Let U(9 j/9 i,k(9 ±)) denote the profit of a 9 i finn when invests k(9 t ) and the regulator believes its type
is 9 y Tlicn, using equations (1),(6) and (7) and regrouping terms,
Yi(9
1/9 vk(90) = (9 1/k(9 1 ))
(1 - e)ni+e)[(e+l)/4(e-l)] + (s/2-r)k(9
1 ) and
11(9/9^(9,)) - (9j/k(9 1))
{1 - e)/n+e) [(3e-l)/4(e-l)-9
1/29 3] + (s/2-r)k(9 i )-
9 Vic second order condition for a maximum is given by d 2R/dk2 (evaluated at S(k) - 9 ) < 0, where
d 2Il/dk2 =
-[6(k)/kf2(ni+e) {[(7e + 1)/4( e + l)J(6'(k) 2/kS(k)) + f(l-e)/(l+ e)JS '(k)/k 2 + S"(k)/2k}.
It is assumed that 6 '(k) and 6 "(k) are such that this condition is satisfied. Note that if 5 "(k) > 0, 8 '(k) <
is sufficient to satisfy this condition, in which case a separating equilibrium does in fact exist.
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In Besanko and Spulber [2], dU/dk = s/2 - r + 9/_k 2 - 5(k)/2k 2 + S'(k)/2k, which evaluated at 6(k)
= 9 and since 5'(k) > when e = results in k(9)* > k(9).
Furthermore, 11(6 ye itk(0 J) > 11(6/9 itk(6 L)) if and only if
^j(i-o/d+o^ e+;y^ € .^y > (e t)a
't)ni+€)[(3e-l)/4(e-iye i/2e iJ, which is equivalent to A >
6J6 j > 1, where
A = {[(e+l^e-l^/KSe-l^e-in^d^} 1^ 1 ^^-^.
Note that A > 1 for all e > 1 and that A - 1 if 6 ± = 6 y Tlien, a sufficient condition for A > 6J6 j is
dA/d(6
i/6 i ) > 1. Since dA/d(6 i/6 i ) = 2A
2(/a+e)
, and since A is greater than one for all 6 i > 6y this
condition is satisfied, meaning that a firm would not like to be taken by a more efficient one given its level of
investment under complete information.
Let us now reverse the roles of i and j so consider the incentives firms have to be confused with a less
efficient one. Note that if j > i, A < 1 for all e > 1 and A = 1 if 6 t = 6 y TJien, A > 6J6 ^ if
dA/d(6
1/6 i ) < 1. But 8A/d(6 J6 1 ) = 24
2£/(1+£) (< 2) is not necessarily less than one. 11 Tliis means that
firms want to be taken by a (closely) less efficient one.
Up until now it was shown that if the regulator asks a firm about its type, an inefficient firm would never
say it is more efficient than its true type, and that in fact it has an incentive to tell the regulator that it is (not
much) less efficient than the truth. Now, consider the case in which firms signal that they are less efficient by
investing less and suppose that there is a benefit attached to this different level of investment. Making use of
continuity, the marginal benefit from this different level of investment is of second order, while the gains from
misrepresentation by the relatively efficient finns remains intact. Tfierefore, the more efficient firms have much
stronger incentives to imitate less efficient finns, which means that the incentive compatibility constraint given by
(9) binds in only one direction, ie., for 6 > 9.
IV. 4. A discrete example.
Tliis subsection makes use of subsection IV.3. to characterize the sequential equilibrium when 6 takes
only two values, 6 or 6
x
,
with 6
x
> 6 . From the discussion above, only the second of the two incentive
compatibility constraints below is binding 12
By continuity, for 6 L sufficiently close to 6 y dA/d(6 y/6 j) > 1. See footnote 12 below.
Note that it may happen that neither constraint binds when there is a discrete number of types, ie., if the
types are too different from each other. In this case incomplete information has no effect on investment. I
abstract from this case. Furthermore, as in MUgrom and Roberts [4] for the case of limit pricing the constraint
Yl(6 l,k"(9 1))>Tl(9 l,k*(9o)) i9 ')
11(6^(6,)) > 11(6^(60). (?")
Furthermore, if the equilibrium is separating, k*(6 ) = k(6 Q), since the most efficient firm is never
imitated by a less efficient one and therefore does not have to deviate from the complete infonnation level of
investment to signal its type.
Finally, the beliefs that support the separating equilibrium are given by
6(k) = 9 1 ifk = k"(6^), 6 Q otherwise.
13 '" (13)
Tlierefore, ^(6-J is given by Ti(9o,k"(9o)) = E(6 Q,k*(9 ^J
15
,
which after replacement of (11), (12) and
(13) results in (14) below
(6o/k"(6o))
n ' i)/a+e) (e + l)/4(e-l) + (s/2-r)[k*(9 )-k*(9 J] -
(9 l/k*(9 l)/
1 - €)/(1+e)[(3e-l)/4(e-l) - do/26 J = (14)
Summarizing, for 6 e {9q,9 x}, the (universally divine) sequential equilibrium involves
p = (8(k)/k) 1/a+e) , (11)
f = [(4-a-ae)/(4e-4)](8(k)/k) a
~ e)/(1+e)
+ ask/2 (12)
S(k) = 6 1 if k = k*(6i), do otherwise (13)
k*(6 ) = k(6 ) = [2(2r-s)]'
(l+€)/2
6o
(l ' e)/2
and k"'(6 J implicitly given by
{B*/k*(B*)) {X-^nw(i+l)/4(i-l) + (s/2-r)[k*(9 )-k*(6J]-
(6 1/k"(9 1))
(l ' e)n ^ €)[(3e-l)/4(e-l) - 6o/26J = 0. (14)
For example, for 6 = 1, 9 l « 3/2, r = 1, s = 4/5 and e = 2, k(6 ) = k"(6 ) = 0.2689, k(6 x) =0.2196
and k*(6i) = 0.125. It is easy to check that this is indeed and equilibrium. (And that the incentive compatibility
constraint does not bind for the firm with cost parameter 9 v )
is always binding when there is a continuum of firms.
13
Beliefs S(k) = 9
l if k < k"(9 x), 5(k) = 9 Q otherwise would work also.
14 Note that these beliefs respect the universal divinity criterium (see Cho and Kreps [3]). To see this, note
that beliefs S(k) = 9
x if k < k"''(6 x), S(k) = 6 otherwise, where k"*(9 x) < k'fd^, would support other
separating equilibria. Nevertheless, these beliefs do not respect the universal divinity criterium for out of equilibrium
beliefs, since the regulator believes S(k (9 ^)) = 9q, which is not sensible since the firm with cost parameter 6
would never, regardless of what the regidator believes, choose k* (9 •/).
15 We assume the firm is truthful whenever it is indifferent.
1V.5. An apprwdmalion to the continuous case.
Lastly, we close this section by extending the characterization of the sequential equilibrium with two
types to n types. Notice that the equilibrium relationship in the previous subsection can be repeated between the
firm with cost parameter 8 1 and another firm characterized by 8 % where 8 2 > 8 lt provided that the relationship
between k*(d ) and ^(8-J is as before
16
. The equilibrium below makes use of this property between any two
contiguous types of firms.
Let 8 e {8 0> 8 l ,8^}. Tlien, the (universally divine) sequential equilibrium involves p (k) and T"(k)
as before,
8 L ifk = k^e^fori = ;,....,*.
S(k) =
8 otherwise.
k*(8 ) = k(8 ) = [2(2r-s)f a+€)/2 8 n
' i)/z
and k*(d-J implicitly given by
(e L.i/k*(BL-J)
iX -tmw(e+l)/4(6-l) + (s/2 - r)[k*(8i-i) - k*($OJ -
(8jk i'(80f X
' t)nX
^[(^-D/4^-l) - 8 x .y/28J = 0,
for i = l,...,n.
Here again, as in the example in subsection FV.4 illustrated, underinvestment results for all but one (8q,
the most efficient) finns, provided that successive types of firms are not too far apart .
V. CONCLUSION
Tliis paper considers a one period regulatory game in which a firm possessing private information about
its cost is regulated by a regulator who cannot commit not to use the information revealed after observing the
firm's investment decision.
Besanko and Spulber characterize the separating equilibrium for an inelastic demand. In theirframework,
the extent of underinvestment resulting from lack of commitment is alleviated when there is asymmetric
information, and overinvestment may result for the less efficient firms.
In this paper I consider the case of an elastic demand. Hie equilibrium is also separating but
incomplete information accentuates the underinvestment resultingfrom lack of commitment. Tliis difference is due
3
Tliis is possible because the incentive compatibility constraint binds in only one direction.
See footnote 12.
8
to the fact that the level of investment is a decreasing function of 6 when e > 1, so that the less efficient finns
would be imitated bv the more efficient ones unless they reduce investment beyond the full information level. 18
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